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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 







BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant and two co-defendants were charged with the 
crime of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated (19 5 3) • 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant and both co-defendants were tried jointly on 
January 12-13, 1978, before a jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. All were found guilty 
of the crime of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
Appellant was sentenced to a term of five years to 
life, placed on probation, and granted a stay of execution 
of sentence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction on the basis 
that the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for 
severance and/or mistrial and motion for a new trial constituted 
prejudicial error. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and co.-defendants Carter and Morishita were 
charged with having committed the crime of ac;rgravated robber.-
on or about the 31st day of March, 1977. 
The three were brought to trial jointly on January 12, 
1978. At the close of the State's case, counsel for appellar:' 
rested his case, not having called appellant to the stand. 
Subsequently, during his opening statement, counsel for 
codefendant Morishita claimed he would call appellant Sandova:, 
to the stand to testify and attempted to state what he though: 
Sandoval would say, at which point appellant's counsel objects, 
The Court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to ' 
disregard the matter, pointing out that a defendant could 
not be called to the stand involuntarily. 
A conference was held at side bar during which the 
court informed counsel for Morishita he could not call 
Sandoval as a witness and that the statements of Sandoval 
he wished to elicit were inadmissible under the attorney-
client privilege. 
Counsel fO:E' Morishita completed his opening statement, 
was directed to call his first witness, and, in front of the 
jury, he called co-defendant Sandoval. Appellant's counsel 
again objected and the objection was sustained. He then 
moved for a mistrial and/or severance, and the motion was 
denied. 
Counsel for appellant later argued a motion for a new 
trial which was also denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY 
IS ABSOLUTE AND CANNOT BE USED AGAINST 
HIM IN ANY MANNER. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States, and the Cons ti tut ion of the State of 
Utah, guarantee to a defendant the right to refuse to testify 
in any criminal proceeding against him. 
Further, Section 77-44-5, Utah Code Annoated, (1953) 
states that a defendant's 11 ••• neglect or refusal to be a 
witness shall not in any manner prejudice him or be used 
against him on the trial or proceeding. 11 (emphasis added.) 
The policy underlying such a guarantee is sound in that 
a defendant ought not to be required, in any way, to aid the 
State in establishing its burden of proof, nor should his 
exercise of the privilege be used to his detriment. 
The issue of a defendant's testimonial privilege is 
especially poignant in the setting of a joint trial, where a 
defense attorney's zeal on behalf of his client may lead him 
to attempt to elicit exculpatory testimony from a co-defendant. 
Such an attempt could well serve to prejudice the interest of 
a co-defendant who refuses to testify. 
The case of United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 
(7th Cir. 1965), clearly delineates the problem. In Echeles, 
an attorney appealed his conviction of suborning perjury, 
~peding administration of justice and conspiracy. 
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Echeles was tried jointly with a co-defendant by the 
name of Arrington. Echeles was faced with the ?roblem of 
being unable to call Arrington as a witness because of a 
defendant's testimonial privilege, while needing to enter 
into evidence admissions made by Arrington which would have 
exculpated Echeles. 
In discussing the scope of the Fifth Arnendement, the 
Court in Echeles stated: 
By its first and most familiar 
protection, this Fifth Amendment 
provision gives any person the 
right to refuse to answer questions 
which might tend to incriminate him. 
But equally important is the 
'universally held' interpretation 
of this right prohibiting any person 
who is on trial for a crime from being 
called to the witness stand. 352 
F.2d at 897 (emphasis is original) 
Concerning the right to refuse to testify, the Court 
states further at 897: 
The second protection applies 
without regard to the nature of the 
intended inquiry; that is, a 
defendant on trial cannot be 
required to take the stand to answer 
even the most innocuous, non-
incriminating inquiries. Nor does 
it make a difference whether the 
defendant is called to the stand 
by the prosecution or a co-defendant. 
Clearly, a defendant's right to refuse to testify is 
absolute, whether he be tried jointly or separately. Thus, 
in the instant case, the court's sustaining of appellant' 5 
objections and the admonition to the jury were !Jroper and 
essential. 
-4-
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL 
AND/OR SEVERANCE AND FOR A NEN 
TRIAL CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
The central issue involved in the instant case is 
whether appellant was prejudiced by the statements and conduct 
of counsel for defendant Morishita so as to deny appellant due 
process of law, despite the sustaining of objections by 
appellant's attorney and the Court's admonition to the jury. 
Perhaps the mere mention of the intention to call 
appellant by Morishita' s attorney during his opening state-
ment was insufficient to prejudice appellant's position. The 
admonition to the jury to disregard the matter may have cured 
the prejudice. 
However, certainly the actual calling of appellant by 
counsel for Morishita, after he was instructed not to do so, 
focused the attention of the jury on the implications of a 
defendant's refusal to testify as surely as if a direct 
comment on such failure were to be made by counsel. At that 
point, a motion for mistrial and severance should have been 
granted. Case law clearly favors severance in the interest of 
justice, fairness and impartiality. 
The case of DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 
(5th Cir. 1962), reh. denied 324 F.2d 375 (1963), involved 
two defendants tried jointly for violations of the Narcotic 
Drug Import and Export Act. Each had retained his own 
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attorney. At trial, De Luna did not take the stand, but n~s 
co-defendant Gomez did testify. 
Counsel for Gomez, in his closing argument, commen:e: 
directly on DeLuna's failure to testify and had earlier~~ 
an indirect reference. Counsel for DeLuna objected and t~ 
trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the matter. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded the case for separate trials, stating: 
If an attorney's duty to his 
client should require him to draw 
the jury's attention to the possible 
inference of guilt from a co-
defendant' s silence, the trial 
judge's duty is to order that the 
defendants be tried separately. 
308 F. 2d at 141. 
While DeLuna involved a direct comment on a co-defendr: 
failure to testify, the rationale underlying the sever~~ 
requirement applies with equal force to the instant case. 
The effect upon the impartiality of a jury is the same wheth; 
it derives from a direct comment as in DeLuna or from an 
indirect source as in appellant's case. 
In Echeles, supra., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appea. 
in holding that Echeles' motion for severance should have 
been granted, considered the prejudicial effect of calling 
a co-defendant to testify (citing DeLuna in support thereof: 
Thus, Echeles could not properly 
call Arrington as a witness during 
Echeles' case in chief. For if 
Arrington declined to take the stand, 
as was his right, Echeles' action in 
calling him and forcing him to decline 
to do so in front of the jury would 
-6-
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have injected prejudicial 
error into the record as to 
Arrington. 352 F.2d at 898. 
In United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 
1973), the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's 
conviction for distributing cocaine and denied defendant's 
claim that he be allowed to interrogate a former co-defendant 
where such co-defendant would apparently invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privileges. The Court stated at 1211: 
"Finally, we find without merit 
the claim that Johnson had a right 
to have Perry called as a witness 
before the jury. (citations 
omitted) If it appears that a 
witness intends to claim the 
privilege as to essentially all 
questions, the court may, in its 
discretion, refuse to allow him 
to take the stand. Neither side 
has the right to benefit from any 
inferences the jury may draw simply 
from the witness' assertion of the 
privilege either alone or in con-
junction with questions that have 
been put to him." 
POINT III 
THE ERRORS RAISED HEREIN CONCERN 
A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
AND ARE PRESUMED TO BE PREJUDICIAL. 
Due to the trial court's refusal to sever or grant a 
motion for a new trial, appellant was denied a fundamental 
constitutional right--the right to be tried by an impartial 
jury. 
The inference to be drawn from appellant's refusal to 
take the stand after being called by counsel for Morishita 
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can only have influenced the jury adversely and 9rejudicial[': 
as to appellant. 
When a fundamental constitutional right has been abused 
or denied, any error pertaining thereto is presumed to be 
prejudicial. The Supreme Court of Utah adopted this position 
in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970), 
stating: 
We think the correct view, and 
the one which is both practical 
and in keeping with the desired 
objective of fundamental fairness 
and due process of law, is that 
there is a presumption that such 
error is prejudicial, but that it 
can be overcome when the court 
is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it had no such prejudicial 
effect upon the proceedings. 468 
P.2d at 643. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the same 
standard in the case of Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261 
(10th Cir. 1972), stating: 
Before a Federal constitutional 
error can be held harmless, the 
court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 461 F.2d at 265. 
In the case at bar, appellant was denied a trial by an 
impartial jury and the errors pertaining thereto must be 
presumed to be prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
The compelling weight of authority favors a severance 
in circumstances such as those in the case at bar. A co!11111on 
theme throughtout the cases cited is the prejudicial effect 
· calli" ng a co-defendant to testifY· on a Jury of one defendant 
-8-
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In the case at bar, no amount of admonishing the jury 
could purge the prejudicial effect upon appellant of the 
statements and conduct of counsel for Morishita. In fact, 
further admonitions to the jury might only have exacerbated 
the problem. 
If the requirement of Section 77-44-5, Utah Code 
Mnoated, (1953), that a defendant's refusal to testify "shall 
not in any manner prejudice him or be used against him," is 
to be given meaning, then appellant's motion for a new trial 
should have been granted and appellant is entitled to a 
reversal. 
DATED this /,JJ1,aay of September, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
72 East Fourth South, #330 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah this /3iJi..aayof 
September, 1978. 
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